CITIZENS FOR SURVEILLANCE TRANSPARENCY

Automated license plate reader cameras mounted on poles in neighborhoods across the country. Scans and records every vehicle that passes, storing plate numbers, vehicle make, model, color, and unique features. Deployed by over 5,000 law enforcement agencies.

The largest commercial ALPR database in the United States. Contains billions of plate scans collected from law enforcement, private companies, and repo agencies. Searchable by police without a warrant in most jurisdictions.

Scrapes publicly available social media posts and builds psychological and behavioral profiles. Used by federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security and the IRS Criminal Investigation division.

Tracks the physical location of cell phones using advertising data purchased from data brokers. No warrant required. Used by CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, and other federal agencies to track individuals in real time.

Link analysis software that maps relationships between people, organizations, phone numbers, email addresses, social media accounts, and other data points. Used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide.

Tracks approximately 250 million cell phones through advertising data collected from common mobile apps. Provides location history searchable by law enforcement without judicial oversight. Used by local and federal agencies.

In 2019, eBay's former Senior Director of Safety and Security — a former FBI and CIA contractor — directed a team of employees to conduct a coordinated surveillance, stalking, and harassment campaign against two journalists who published critical coverage of the company. The operation included in-person surveillance across state lines, an attempt to install a GPS tracker on the victims' vehicle, monitoring police scanners to stay ahead of investigators, and the use of prepaid debit cards, disguises, and overseas email accounts to conceal the company's involvement. Seven former eBay employees pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges including conspiracy to commit cyberstalking and conspiracy to tamper with witnesses. The longest sentence was 57 months in federal prison. eBay itself was criminally charged and agreed to pay a $3 million penalty under a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice. In July 2026, the victims received a $55.7 million civil settlement.

Calgary millionaire Ken Carter paid over $800,000 to a firm run by retired Calgary Police officer Steve Walton to conduct a two-year stalking and harassment campaign against his ex-partner during a custody dispute. The operation employed active, suspended, and retired Calgary Police Service officers who were paid to illegally access police databases to retrieve personal information about the victim and her associates. A GPS tracking device was placed on the victim's vehicle. Text messages presented in court showed Carter writing "we need to push her over the edge" and "keep it up until she breaks." Carter and Walton were convicted of criminal harassment and sentenced to three years in prison. Three Calgary police officers were convicted of corruption-related crimes and received sentences of 3 to 30 months. The Waltons were additionally convicted of bribing police officers. Appeals were denied in 2022. Sources: CBC News, Global News, Blue Line Magazine.

Stockton City Manager Bob Deis was subjected to a coordinated harassment campaign by the Stockton Police Officers Association after contract negotiations broke down. The police union purchased the house adjacent to Deis's home and used it as a base of operations for ongoing harassment, including persistent noise disruption and the destruction of trees along the shared property line. A bumper sticker was placed on Deis's personal vehicle without his knowledge or consent — a deliberate psychological tactic using his name as a visual pun. The harassment was publicly confirmed by Stockton Mayor Ann Johnston and reported by KCRA Channel 3 (NBC Sacramento). Deis resigned, stating he had been "operating in crisis mode for three years." Source: KCRA, Press Democrat, The Record.

NYPD Officer Adrian Schoolcraft secretly recorded hundreds of hours of audio exposing arrest quotas, crime stat manipulation, and systemic corruption in Brooklyn's 81st Precinct. When he reported it, his supervisors declared him "emotionally disturbed." On Halloween night 2009, a dozen officers and an Emergency Service Unit broke into his apartment without a warrant, handcuffed him, and dragged him to Jamaica Hospital's psychiatric ward. Police lied to hospital staff about his behavior to justify his commitment. He was held for six days against his will.

Schoolcraft had a backup recorder his supervisors never found. He recorded the entire forced commitment.

A federal judge later called his recordings "smoking gun evidence" in the landmark stop-and-frisk case Floyd v. City of New York, which led to the creation of an inspector general to oversee the NYPD.

Settlement: $600,000 from the City of New York plus back pay and benefits. Separate settlement with Jamaica Hospital. Total compensation exceeded $1 million. His recordings confirmed what a $50 million internal NYPD investigation later found — quotas and underreporting were real.

The pattern: Report misconduct → get labeled mentally ill → forced psychiatric intervention → held against your will → career destroyed → years of litigation → eventually vindicated. The label was the weapon. The hospital was the prison. The system protected itself by discrediting the person who exposed it.

His quote to NBC News: "What is this, Russia?" Sources: NBC News, The Village Voice, Gothamist, Associated Press.

• Repeated unfounded reports submitted to law enforcement, employers, regulatory agencies, child protective services, or professional licensing boards designed to consume the victim's time and resources.

• Anonymous or pseudonymous complaints filed across multiple agencies simultaneously, creating the appearance of widespread concern from unrelated parties.

• Direct contact with the victim's employer, clients, colleagues, or business associates to make allegations or share damaging claims.

• Recruitment of third parties — including strangers, acquaintances, or professionals — to observe, report on, or confront the victim.

• Deliberate circulation of personal information about the victim through group communications, social media, online forums, or community networks.

• Coordinated efforts to encourage others to file complaints, initiate investigations, or publicly challenge the victim.

• Misuse of legal processes, including frivolous lawsuits, restraining orders, or regulatory complaints, not to seek legitimate resolution but to impose financial and psychological cost.

• Systematic efforts to damage the victim's professional reputation, income, or community standing through repeated false or misleading claims.

• Covert monitoring of the victim's digital activity, movements, or communications — either directly or through intermediaries with access to surveillance tools or institutional databases.

• Use of multiple identities, anonymous accounts, or coordinated groups to create the false impression that many unrelated individuals have independent concerns about the victim.

• Framing harassment campaigns as legitimate expressions of concern, public safety, accountability, or whistleblowing.

• Characterizing the victim as mentally unstable, paranoid, delusional, or dangerous when they attempt to describe what is happening to them.

• Creating an environment in which the victim feels constantly observed, followed, or exposed — even when no single incident appears criminal in isolation.

• Deriving visible satisfaction or strategic advantage from the victim's distress, defensiveness, or deteriorating circumstances.

When victims of coordinated harassment search online for what is happening to them, the results overwhelmingly characterize their experiences as symptoms of mental illness — paranoia, delusional disorder, or psychosis. This framing persists despite multiple proven cases involving criminal convictions, federal guilty pleas, and multimillion-dollar settlements. In the eBay case, a team of corporate employees conducted a sophisticated, multi-state stalking operation for months before anyone believed the victims. In the Calgary case, active police officers used department databases to track a woman for two years while the perpetrators described their own operation as "risk management." In the Stockton case, a police union conducted an open harassment campaign against a city official who was then characterized as being in a personal dispute. In the Schoolcraft case, an NYPD officer who recorded evidence of systemic corruption was declared "emotionally disturbed" by his own department, forcibly committed to a psychiatric ward for six days, and suspended without pay — a textbook use of psychiatric institutionalization as a weapon against a whistleblower. In each case, the victims described exactly what was happening to them — and in each case, the reality was confirmed only after criminal investigation. The documented pattern is clear: perpetrators deliberately exploit the assumption that anyone who reports coordinated harassment must be mentally ill. That assumption is itself a weapon — and major search engines reinforce it by surfacing dismissive content above documented evidence.

An officer in Norfolk, Virginia entered "la la la la" as his search justification for querying the ALPR database. He did this repeatedly, accounting for nearly one-third of approximately 230,000 searches over two years. Nobody noticed. Nobody asked. 230,000 searches. La la la la.

A Florida sheriff's deputy used an ALPR to track and pull over a woman he saw at a television shoot. Because when you have access to a nationwide surveillance network, why use a dating app? He queried his ex's plate at least 69 times. Nice.

A Georgia police chief used Flock cameras to track his ex-girlfriend and her teenage daughter approximately 600 times. Using taxpayer-funded surveillance technology to stalk a teenager. Chief of police. Six hundred times.

A Texas sheriff's deputy searched 83,000 Flock ALPRs to locate a woman who had allegedly obtained a medication abortion — at the request of her abusive partner. Law enforcement: helping abusers find their victims since whenever they got the database password.

A Kentucky police officer was arrested after tracking his ex-girlfriend on the Flock camera system over 2,000 times. Two thousand. That's not a search. That's a relationship.

At least 47 officers nationwide have been caught using Flock cameras to stalk romantic interests. One Florida officer queried his ex's plate 69 times. A sheriff searched for his wife's vehicle hundreds of times. A police chief was arrested after using plate readers to stalk and harass multiple people including a former partner. These men had access to a nationwide surveillance network and used it like a dating app with a badge and a gun. The Institute for Justice says 47 is "almost certainly an undercount." We believe them.

FLOCK Safety operates automated license plate reader cameras mounted on poles in neighborhoods across the United States. The cameras scan and record every vehicle that passes, storing plate numbers, vehicle make, model, color, and unique identifying features. The system is deployed by more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide.

In most jurisdictions, no. License plate reader databases are typically searchable by law enforcement without a warrant because courts have generally held that vehicle movements on public roads carry no expectation of privacy. Individual states and municipalities may impose their own warrant requirements through local policy.

Regional Information Sharing Systems, known as RISS, are six federally funded networks that share law enforcement data across state lines. The six centers are MAGLOCLEN, MOCIC, NESPIN, RMIN, ROCIC, and WSIN. Together they connect approximately 10,800 agencies across every U.S. state.

Locate X tracks the physical location of cell phones using advertising data purchased from commercial data brokers. Because the data is purchased rather than compelled, no warrant is required. Federal agencies including Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Secret Service have used the tool to track individuals.

Attend your local city council or county commission meeting and ask directly whether the municipality has contracted with FLOCK Safety or any automated license plate reader vendor. You can also file a public records request under FOIA or your state's public records law to obtain contracts, usage policies, and data retention schedules.

Yes. In Steiner v. eBay Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-11181 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seven eBay employees pleaded guilty to federal charges after conducting a coordinated surveillance and cyberstalking campaign against two journalists. The operation included cross-state surveillance and an attempted GPS tracker installation. eBay paid a $3 million criminal penalty and a $55.7 million civil settlement in July 2026.

Alabama — Ala. Code §36-12-40 (residents only)
Alaska — Alaska Stat. §09.25.100–.220
Arizona — Ariz. Rev. Stat. §39-121
Arkansas — Ark. Code Ann. §25-19-101 (FOIA, residents only)

California — Cal. Gov. Code §6250–6270 (Public Records Act)
Colorado — C.R.S. §24-72-201 (Open Records Act)
Connecticut — Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-200 (FOIA)

Delaware — 29 Del. C. §10001 (FOIA, residents only)
District of Columbia — DC Code §2-531 (FOIA)

Florida — Fla. Stat. §119.01–.165 (Sunshine Law)

Georgia — Ga. Code §50-18-70 (Open Records Act)

Hawaii — Haw. Rev. Stat. §92F-1 (UIPA)

Idaho — Idaho Code §9-338–350
Illinois — 5 ILCS 140/1 (FOIA)
Indiana — Ind. Code §5-14-3-1 (Access to Public Records Act)
Iowa — Iowa Code §22.1–.14 (Open Records)

Kansas — Kan. Stat. §45-215–225 (Open Records Act)
Kentucky — Ky. Rev. Stat. §61.870–.884 (Open Records Act, residents only)

Louisiana — La. Rev. Stat. §44:31 (Public Records Act)

Maine — Me. Rev. Stat. §1-13 §408 (FOAA)
Maryland — Md. Code §10-611–628 (Public Information Act)
Massachusetts — Mass. Gen. Laws Ch.66 §10 (Public Records Law)
Michigan — MCL §15.231 (FOIA)
Minnesota — Minn. Stat. §13.03 (Data Practices Act)
Mississippi — Miss. Code §25-61-1 (Public Records Act)
Missouri — Mo. Stat. §109.180 (Sunshine Law)
Montana — Mont. Code §2-6-101

Nebraska — Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712 (Public Records)
Nevada — Nev. Rev. Stat. §239.005–.040
New Hampshire — NH Rev. Stat. §91-A:1 (Right-to-Know Law)
New Jersey — N.J.S.A. §47:1A-1 (OPRA, residents only)
New Mexico — §14-2-1 NMSA 1978 (Inspection of Public Records Act)
New York — NY Pub. Off. Law §84 (FOIL)
North Carolina — N.C. Gen. Stat. §132-1–10 (Public Records Law)
North Dakota — N.D. Cent. Code §44-04-18 (Open Records)

Ohio — Ohio Rev. Code §149.43 (Public Records Act)
Oklahoma — Okla. Stat. Tit. 51 §24A.1 (Open Records Act)
Oregon — Or. Rev. Stat. §192.410–.505 (Public Records Law)

Pennsylvania — 65 Pa.C.S. §66.1–.4 (Right-to-Know Law)

Rhode Island — R.I. Gen. Laws §38-2-1 (Access to Public Records Act)

South Carolina — S.C. Code §30-4-10 (FOIA)
South Dakota — S.D. Codified Laws §1-27-1 (Open Records)

Tennessee — Tenn. Code §10-7-503 (Public Records Act, residents only)
Texas — Tex. Gov. Code §552.001–.353 (Public Information Act)

Utah — Utah Code §63G-2-101 (GRAMA)

Vermont — 1 V.S.A. §315–320 (Public Records Act)
Virginia — Va. Code §2.2-3704 (FOIA, residents only)

Washington — Wash. Rev. Code §42.56.001–.904 (Public Records Act)
West Virginia — W.Va. Code §29B-1-1 (FOIA)
Wisconsin — Wis. Stat. §19.31–.39 (Open Records Law)
Wyoming — Wyo. Stat. §9-2-407 (Public Records Act)

A project by the Electronic Frontier Foundation documenting surveillance technologies deployed by law enforcement agencies across the United States. Searchable database of police surveillance tech by city and county.

A crowdsourced map of automated license plate reader cameras nationwide. Volunteers photograph and geotag ALPR cameras so the public can see where they are deployed in their communities.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation's comprehensive resource on police surveillance technology, including ALPRs, drones, body cameras, cell-site simulators, and facial recognition.